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[So F. No. 19037. In Bank. Sept. 20, 1955.1 
LUCYLE W. PENCOVIC, Respondent, v. FRANCIS H. 
PENCOVIC, Appellant. 
[1] Divorce-Support of Children-Modification of Allowance.-
Under Civ. Code, § 139, declaring that the portion of a divorce 
decree making support allowances may be modified at any time 
at court's discretion, trial court, in exercise of its discretion, 
must consider the needs of the dependents and the ability of 
the divorced husband to meet those needs. 
[2] Id.-Support of Children-Modification of Allowance.-Orders 
of trial court modifying that portion of divorce decree making 
support allowances need not be based on actual income or 
property of divorced husband, but may be based solely on 
his ability to earn money. 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Divorce and Separation, § 280; Am.Jur., 
Divorce and Separation, § 703. 
• McK. Dig. References: [1-3, 8] Divorce, § 300; [4] Parent and 
Child, § 18; [5] Constitutional L~w, § 115; [GJ Constitutional Law, 
S ll3; [7] Parent and Child, ~ 18. 
) 
-"', 
be reached by this court which will be consonant with the 
quality of justice which should be administered by a court of 
justice, is that the judgment& as to all counts should bl." 
reversed and the defendant should be granted a new trial. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied December 
28, 1955. Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., and Traynor, J., were of 
the opinion that the petition should be granted. 
.. ) 
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[3] Id,-Support of Ohildren-Modification of Allowance.-An 
order increasing the amount of an a.ward for the support of 
two children under an original divorce decree from $20 a 
month to $50 a month for each child did not constitute an 
abuse of discL'ction where the children, who were some nine 
years older than at the date of the original order, had greater 
needs for food, clothing and medical services j where their 
mether, who had been their chief source of support, was 
permanently disabled in an automobile accident and was 
$1,000 in debt for the care of the children and the payment 
of hospital bills; and where their father, who shortly after 
the divorce founded and was the leader of a religious society 
which paid him no salary as such but which paid all of his 
expenses, including the support of his children, was an able-
bodied man and had the earning capacity to discharge the 
obligation of the increased support award even if the society 
would not provide him with additional funds to pay such 
award. 
[4] Parent and Ohild-Support of Ohild.-A parent may not evade 
the obligation to support his minor children by refusing for 
religious reasons to seck or accept gainful employment. 
[5] Oonstitutional Law-Fundamental Rights-Religious Freedom. 
-Although the guarantee of religious freedom of U.S. Const., 
1st Amendment, is binding on the states under the due process 
clause of the 14th Amendment, the states may nevertheless 
regulate conduct for the protection of society, and insofar as 
such regulations are directed towards a proper end and are 
not discriminatory they may indirectly affect religious activi-
ties without infringing the constitutional guarantee. 
[6] Id,-Fundamental Rights-Scope.-Although freedom of con-
science and the freedom to believe' are absolute, the freedom to 
act is not. 
[7~ Parent and Ohild-Support of Ohild.-The Constitution does 
not compel the subordination of the statutory duty of a parent 
to support his child to a rule of religious conduct prohibiting 
gainful employment. 
[8] Divorce-Support of Ohildren-Modification of Allowance.-
An order increasing the amount of an award for the support 
of two children under an original divorce decree from $20 
a month to $50 a month for each child was not inconsistent 
with an order discharging a contempt citation on the ground 
that there was no showing that the divorced husband was able 
[4] See Oal,Jur., Parent and Child, § 18; Am.Jur., Parent and 
Child, § 35. 
(5] See Oa1.Jur.2d, Constitutional Law, i ~ et ieq.; Ala..Jv .. 
Constitutional Law, § 3l2. . . 
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to pay all of the accrued arrearages where, though there was 
110 direct evidence of the amount of such arrearages, it 
might be inferred that it wa~ in excess of $2,000. 
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Alameda 
County increasing amount of award for support of children 
and allowing divorced wife's costs and fees for her attorney. 
A. J. 'Voolsey, Judge. Affirmed. 
Gross & Svenson and Henry J. Gross for Appellant. 
Edwards & Friborg and Alan G. Banks for Respon6.ent. 
TRA YNOR, J.-Plaintiff and defendant were married in 
1937 and had two children, a son and a daughter. In 1944 
plaintiff obtained a divorce and was given custody of the 
children, who were then 6 and 4 years of age respectively. 
Defendant was ordered to pay $20 per month for the support 
of each child. He made one payment, entered the army, and 
authorized an allotment for his children. From the time of 
his discharge late in 1945 until 1951 he made no payments for 
the support of his children, who depended in part on assist-
ance from Alameda county. In 1951 the county instituted 
criminal proceedings against him. He was found guilty of 
nonsupport and ordered to pay $20 per month for each child 
in accordance with the divorce decree and $10 per month for 
each child for unpaid arrearages. Since then plaintiff has 
received $30 per month for each child from defendant through 
the probation officer of Alameda County. 
In November 1953 plaintiff filed an affidavit alleging that 
her earning capacity had been impaired in an automobile 
accident, that the children required more money for their 
support, and that she believed that defendant's income was 
$1,000 per month. She requested the court to increase the 
support for the children to $100 per month for each child. 
The court ordered defendant to show cause why he should not 
be punished for contempt for disobedience of the original 
support order and why that order should not be modified as 
requested by plaintiff. After a hearing on the orders to show 
cause, the court discharged the contempt citation and ordered 
defendant to pay $50 per month for the support of each 
child and plaintiff's costs and fees for her attorney. De-
fendant appeals. 
[1] Section 139 of the Civil Code provides. "That portioa 
100 PI'~NCOVrc V. PENCOVIO (45 C.2d 
of the decree or judgment making any such [support] allow-
ance or allowances •.. may be modified or revoked at any 
time at the discretion of the COllrt .... " In the exercise of 
its discretion, the trial court must considu the need~ of the 
• dependents and the ability of the husband to meet those 
needs. (SweeZey v. SweeZey, 28 Ca1.2d 389, 394 [170 P.2d 
469].) [2] Its orders, however, need not be based upon the 
actual income or property of the husband, but may be based 
solely upon his ability to earn money. ("Webber v. Webber, 
33 Cal.2d 153, 160 [199 P.2d 9~4:]; Eidenmuller v. Eiden-
muller, 37 Cal. 364, 366; Tompkins v. Tompkins, 83 Cal.App. 
2d 71, 79 [187 P.2d 840].) [3] No abuse of discretion is 
disclosed by the record in this case. There is ample evidence 
of changed circumstances and of defendant's financial ability 
to meet his children's needs and of his ability to earn money 
in the future. 
The two children, now teenagers attending high school, 
have greater needs for food, clothing, and medical services 
than at the date of the original order. Living expenses are 
greater, but their mother, who has been their chief source 
of support, was permanently disabled in an automobile acci-
dent, spent a year and one half in a hospital, and is $1,000 
in debt for the care of the children and the payment of 
hospital bills. She is employed as a Blue Cross Hospital clerk 
at $200 a month, but because of her injury cannot work 
steadily. For two and one half years she was completely un-
employed and her earnings for the past year have been less 
than $150 a month. Since it now costs $127 a month for 
the care of the son and $118 a month for the care of the 
daughter, she was been unable to feed and clothe herself and 
the children on her earnings. 
When plaintiff obtained the interlocutory decree, defendant 
told her that he would "plan h·is life accordingly so he would 
be protected." He said that he would "form this organiza-
tion where people would giTe all their possessions into the 
organization and he would be the head of the organization, 
nothing would be in his name, everything would be in the 
name of the organization, yet he would have them arrange 
for all the money he wanted to use any time he wanted it." 
Defendant's principal contention is that he has neither 
money nor property nor earnings and that he is therefore 
without ability to pay the increased amounts. At no time 
has he contended that he is unable to earn sufficient money 
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at the shipyards in Oakland as a timekeeper, and at the 
time of the divorce he was working as a machinist's helper 
for about $75 a wcek. ShortlJ; after the divorce he changed 
his name to Krishna Venta and founded a religious society, 
the "W.K.F.L. Fountain." (The letters stand for wisdom, 
knowledge, faith, and love.) The society was incorporated 
in 1951 and is governed by a board of directors and officers. 
Defendant is the treasurer of the society and its spiritual 
leader or "Master." Neither he nor anyone connected with 
the society receives a salary as such. About 100 members re-
side at a home maintained by the society at Canoga Park in 
Ventura County. They have a communal system of living 
and none of them works on the outside. All food, clothing, 
and medical care are provided by the society. Funds are 
obtained from new members, who transfer all their property 
to the society on being admitted to membership, and from 
gifts, plays presented by the members, and donations received 
for fighting fires. Defendant and his present wife and their 
young daughter occupy a small room and five other children 
of defendant's sleep in a garage made into a bedroom with 
three other children living at the society's home. Defendant 
makes periodic automobile trips to Denver to carryon the 
work of the society. Occasionally he stops at Las Vegas and 
Reno tie gamble, and on some occasions the society and various 
persons have advanced him money for that purpose, but he has 
never won. In Las Vegas he once lost $2,900 and in payment 
drew checks on a bank in which he had no funds. The society 
paid part of the amount due on the checks and no civil action 
or criminal charges. were brought against defendant for 
issuing them. The society paid the cost of a trip by defendant 
to Europe in 1949, a trip to South America in 1951, and 
trips in 1952 to 54 cities in the United States to study fire 
equipment and fire departments and to advance the cause of 
the society. A member of the board of directors usually ac-
companies him on trips and handles temporal matters. For 
all contributions that he receives and for all his expenditures 
defendant accounts to the board of directors, and there is no 
evidence of unauthorized use of society funds. The society 
pays all of defendant's expenses, including the $60 per month 
for the support of his children ordered at the criminal pro-
ceeding, and at the time of that proceeding it also s~pplied 
him with funds with whic11 to buy gifts for his children, ice 
skates costing $65 for his daughter and a wrist watch, tennis 
) 
. . 
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shoes, and othCi." gifts for his son. It also paid the fees for 
his attorney in both the 1951 and present proceedings. 
Although defendant contends that the support he receives 
from the society constitutes only a gift to him and that his 
services are in turn rendered gratuitously, the trial court could 
reasonably infer from the foregoing evidence that he is in 
fact receiving compensation from the society for the ser-
vices he renders as its spiritual leader or "Master." Moreover, 
in the past this compensation has been measured by defend-
ant's needs, including his obligation to support his children. 
Accordingly, the trial court could reasonably conclude that 
the amount of his compensation would be increased to meet 
any additional obligation imposed upon him, and his reason-
able expectation of securing such additional compensation 
could properly be considered in determining his ability to 
pay. (Woolams v. lVoolams, 115 Cal.App.2d 1, 7 [251 P.2d 
392] ; see Federb'ltsh v. Federbush, 5 N.J.Super. 107 [68 A.2d 
473, 476] ; In re Aspenleiter's Estate, 114 N.Y.S.2d 486, 488.) 
Under these circumstances the fact that the society is not 
obligated to support defendant's children is immaterial, for 
in fact it has adopted as the measure of his compensation 
his needs, including his obligation to support his children. 
The society and defendant, by determining the compensation 
by reference to defendant's needs instead of by adopting a 
fixed rate, cannot compel the court to ignore the fact that 
under their existing arrangement defendant's compensation 
as measured by his needs includes his obligation to support 
his children. 
Even if the trial court concluded, however, that defendant 
was not receiving compensation, but only gifts, and that the 
society would not provide him with additional funds to dis. 
charge the increased support award, its order would not con-
stitute an abuse of discretion, Defendant is an able-bodied 
man, and the trial court could reasonably conclude that he 
had the earning capacity to discharge the obligation of the 
support award. [4] By refusing for religious reasons to 
seek or accept gainfnl employment defendant may not evade 
that obligation. [5] Although the guarantee of religious 
freedom of the First Amendment of the Constitution of the 
United States is binding on the states under the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth (Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 
296, 303 [60 S.Ct, 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213, 128 A.L.R. 1352]), 
the states may nevertheless regulate conduct for the protec-
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towards a proper end and are not discriminatory, they may 
indirectly affect religious activities without infringing the 
constitutional guarantee..[6] Although freedom of con-
science and the freedom to believe are absolute, the freedom 
to act is not. (Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 169-
170 [64 8.0t. 438, 88 L.Ed. 645]; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 
310 U.S. 296, 303-304 [60 S.Ot. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213, 128 
A.L.R. 1352] ; Jacobson v.Massachusetts, 197 U.S. l1, 29 [25 
8.0t. 358, 49 L.Ed. 643] ; Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342-
344 [10 8.0t. 299, 33 IJ.Ed. 637] ; Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 
U.S. 15, 45 [5 8.0t. 747, 29 L.Ed. 47] ; Reynolds v. Un1~ted 
States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 [25 L.Ed. 244] ; People ex rel. Wallace 
v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 626, 104 N.E.2d 769, 30 A.L.R.2d 
1132, cert. den., 344 U.S. 824 [73 8.0t. 24, 97 L.Ed. 642], 
and see cases collected in 30 A.L.R.2d 1138-1141.) [7] Oer-
tainly there are few interests of greater importance to the 
state than the proper discharge by parents of their duties 
to their children, and the Oonstitution does not compel the 
subordination of the statutory duty of a parent to support 
his child to a rule of religious conduct prohibiting gainful 
employment. 
[8] Defendant contends finally that the order increasing 
the amount of the support award is inconsistent with the 
order discharging the contempt citation, on the ground that 
the court stated with respect to the alleged contempt that 
he did not "think there has been any showing •.. of ability 
to pay." Since defendant was paying $20 per month on the 
accrued arrear ages in addition to the $40 per month cur-
rently due under the w.-iginal order, the contempt citation 
was presumably based on his failure to pay all of the balance 
of the accrued arrear ages. There is no direct evidence of 
the amount of such arrearages but it may be inferred that it 
is in excess of $2,000. Accordingly, it cannot be said that 
the tria1 court's conclusion that defendant was unable to 
pay all of the accrued arrearages was inconsistent with its 
implied finding that he was cUl'rently able to pay the increased 
monthly award. 
The orders are affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer, 
J., and Spence, J., concurred.' 
